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PLURALISM , THE PEOPLE , AND TIME IN
LABOUR PARTY HISTORY, –*
J EREMY NUTTALL
Kingston University
A B S T R AC T . Observing the increasing, yet still partial exploration of pluralism, complexity and
multiplicity in recent Labour party historiography, this article pursues a pluralist approach to Labour
on two central, related themes of its middle-century evolution. First, it probes the plurality of Labour’s
different conceptions of time, speciﬁcally how it lived with the ambiguity of simultaneously viewing
social progress as both immediate and rapidly achievable, yet also long term and strewn with
constraints. This co-existence of multiple time-frames highlights the party’s uncertainty and
ideological multi-dimensionality, especially in its focus both on relatively rapid economic or structural
transformation, and on much more slow-moving cultural, ethical, and educational change. It also
complicates neat characterizations of particular phases in the party’s history, challenging
straightforwardly declinist views of the post-– period. Secondly, time connects to Labour’s
view of the people. Whilst historians have debated between positive and negative perceptions of the
people, here the plural, split mind of Labour about the progressive potential of the citizenry is stressed,
one closely intertwined with its multiple outlook on how long socialism would take. Contrasts are also
suggested between the time-frames and expectations under which Labour and the Conservatives
operated.
I
If there has been any dominant trend in writing on the history of the
Labour party over the past twenty years, it has been in favour of an emphasis
on the complexity and multi-sided nature of that history. If there is a
vogue in contemporary Labour historiography, it is, in short, pluralism.
The economic and high political focus of much previous scholarship has
been succeeded by a marked broadening of the spheres in which the party’s
history has been located, with a growing assertion of the importance of
ideas, political culture, communication, ethics and character in inﬂuencing
* The author would like to thank the two anonymous referees for their helpful comments
and suggestions on the article.
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Labour’s development. This broadening of spheres has been closely linked to a
pluralist view of causation, in which Labour’s fortunes are portrayed as having
been inﬂuenced by a diverse range of factors, and political history itself has
been presented as, in Black’s words, a ‘ﬂuid, multiple’ phenomenon. Labour’s
organizational pluralism has also been emphasized, the variety of its afﬁliated
organizations, from trade unions to socialist societies, and the different levels of
its decision-making structures adding further, as Worley observes, to the party’s
‘multiple character’.
Yet, it would be wrong to exaggerate how conscious or coherent the move
towards greater pluralism has been. The term itself is still relatively rarely
explicitly used by Labour historians, and Beers’s recent aside about the
desirability of a ‘pluralistic model’ is a striking reminder of the absence of
anything so systematic as a pluralist school of Labour historiography. Perhaps
beﬁtting an approach that stresses complexity, multi-sidedness, and few grand
claims, pluralism’s incursion has been a quiet, stealthy one with historians
gradually, incrementally adding to the sense of Labour’s story as a beast of many
dimensions and parts.
If pluralism’s historiographical advance has been somewhat covert, there
have also been some striking omissions from its reach. This article seeks to offer
an analysis in which pluralism, the multi-sided nature of Labour, is more overtly
and fully foregrounded than is sometimes the case, through a consideration of
two major, and connected, themes in the party’s history. The ﬁrst of these, time,
has been relatively little considered by the party’s historians. The second,
Labour’s relationship with ‘the people’, has, in sharp contrast, been examined
in recent decades perhaps more than any other feature of the party’s history, yet
the role of pluralism and multi-sidedness within that relationship has been, at
least in certain key respects, surprisingly underdeveloped.
Time, and more speciﬁcally the co-existence in Labour’s thinking of short-
and long-term time-frames within which social progress might be achieved,
has received notably little attention from the party’s historians. Yet, different
perspectives on the time progressive advancement might take lay at the heart of
Labour’s political ideology, and its internal disagreements. At the core of this
 See, respectively: B. Jackson, Equality and the British left: a study in progressive political thought,
– (Manchester, ); L. Black, The political culture of the left in afﬂuent Britain, –
: old Labour, new Britain? (Basingstoke, ); L. Beers, Your Britain: media and the making of
the Labour party (London, ); M. Francis, ‘Economics and ethics: the nature of Labour’s
socialism, –’, Twentieth Century British History,  (), pp. –; and J. Nuttall,
Psychological socialism: the Labour party and qualities of mind and character,  to the present
(Manchester, ).
 L. Black, Redeﬁning British politics: culture, consumerism and participation, –
(Basingstoke, ), p. .
 M. Worley, ‘Introduction’, in M. Worley, ed., The foundations of the British Labour party:
identities, cultures and perspectives, – (Farnham, ), pp. –.
 L. Beers, ‘Labour’s Britain, ﬁght for it now!’, Historical Journal,  (), pp. –, at
p. .
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was the issue of whether Labour was primarily about achieving a relatively
rapid and radical transformation in the structures and institutions of social and
economic power, or a much more long-term, evolutionary change in which
underlying British values and culture moved in a gradually more egalitarian or
co-operative direction. The role of the long term in the party’s history has been
especially neglected. The aforementioned recent research suggesting that
Labour’s vision of a more just or equal society might be as much about values,
culture, ideas, education, and character as about economics, structures, and
institutions has implications for the speed at which one might expect the party
to achieve that vision. Assessing Labour’s impact on changes in such intangible
or relatively slow-burning spheres as, say, education, ethics, or civil liberties
might necessitate a time-frame of many decades. But such developments have
proved difﬁcult to integrate into studies of the party, which are understandably
often structured in short, self-contained phases of ﬁve- or ten-year govern-
mental periods. In sum, the broadening in the spheres (for instance, cultural,
ethical, educative, and economic) through which we now view the party’s
history needs to be accompanied by a broadening of our understanding of the
time-frames in which Labour operated.
Throughout the period between  and , Labour saw socialism as
something both fast and slow, relatively immediately achievable, yet also
very long term. This pluralism of time-frames reﬂected differences between
Labour’s left and right. On the whole, the left wished to move faster, the right
more gradually, though there were some noteworthy reversals of this. But
perhaps even more striking was the plurality of longer- and short-term time-
frames existing within the thinking of most leading Labour ﬁgures. In other
words, individuals across Labour’s ideological spectrum, and thus the party as a
whole had split minds on the different ways in which their aims were short term
and rapid, or long term and gradual.
Moreover, the historical resilience and continuity of this split mind was
considerable. The article considers the reasons for the co-existence of Labour’s
different time-frames over a three-decade period in which, in three different
stages, its idealism and vision met the realities of power in a sustained way for
the ﬁrst time: in the s, as it constructed a detailed policy agenda, in
government from , and then in the s, as it reﬂected and reassessed.
Given, in a sense, how youthful Labour was in , and how many tough,
educative experiences in political realities it had undergone by , it is
perhaps the party’s patience that is most noteworthy in the s, and yet the
strength of its continued determined impatience by the s. In other words,
 See, especially, Nuttall, Psychological socialism ; Jackson, Equality ; Black, Political culture.
 Just a few examples are: E. Shaw, Losing Labour’s soul? New Labour and the Blair government,
– (London, ); S. Fielding, The Labour governments, – (Manchester,
); M. Francis, Ideas and policies under Labour, – (Manchester, ); and
K. O. Morgan, Labour in power, – (Oxford, ).
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one is struck both by the extent to which, even as early as the s, Labour
ﬁgures were notably hard-headed about how much of a long and difﬁcult road
socialism might be, and yet equally by the resilience of optimism even by 
in how much could change relatively quickly.
Exploring time also opens avenues for reappraisals of periodization in the
party’s history. The Attlee government of – in particular, and the
broader – period surrounding it, have often been seen as a high point,
in a sense, indeed, an endpoint in Labour’s history. Often building on
Hobsbawm’s identiﬁcation of the socio-economic trends apparently constrain-
ing Labour’s ‘forward march’ after the s, historians have pointed variously
to the reduced political strength of a relatively homogeneous male, manual
trade unionized working class, decreasing party membership, or the perceived
difﬁculties of the Wilson, Callaghan, or Blair administrations in matching up to
the expectations of them, as evidence that Labour’s high point of achievement,
and its moment of maximum historical opportunity, may have resided in the
s, and been followed by a long decline. Yet, other research has opened
routes to a more pluralist picture in which different Labour objectives advanced
and declined at different times, at different speeds. The revival of historical
interest in ‘the political’ has highlighted the possibility of political parties
inﬂuencing or redeﬁning socio-economic trends in their favour, thus reducing
the centrality of single, linear narratives of a party’s fortunes, and highlighting,
as Stedman Jones has put it, the diverse, ‘discontinuous conjunctures’ in
Labour’s history. Question marks have also been placed on how inherently
negative speciﬁc socio-economic changes need have been for Labour, perhaps
most signiﬁcantly, afﬂuence. Tomlinson has also recently pointed to a need to
reconsider the emphases on decline in the writing of twentieth-century British
history more broadly. Crucially, too, if Labour was as much about expanding
education and people’s horizons as restructuring the economy, the period after
may well, in these respects, have witnessed rather more advancement than
that before it.
Labour’s varying time-scales were further and fundamentally inﬂuenced by
the ﬁnal, linked theme of this article, the party’s perceptions of ‘the people’.
The party’s multi-layered, uncertain sense of socialism as something likely
to occur perhaps quickly, perhaps slowly, was informed by a ﬂuctuating,
 See, for instance, E. Hobsbawm, ‘The forward march of Labour halted?’, Marxism Today,
Sept. , pp. –; D. Howell, British social democracy: a study in development and decay
(London, ), p. ; E. Shaw, The Labour party since  (Oxford, ), p. ; and
P. Hennessy, Never again: Britain, – (London, ), p. .
 G. Stedman Jones, Languages of class: studies in English working-class history, –
(Cambridge, ), pp. –.  Black, Political culture, p. .
 J. Tomlinson, ‘Thrice denied: “declinism” as a recurrent theme in British history in the
long twentieth century’, Twentieth Century British History,  (), pp. –, at pp. , ;
idem, ‘A “failed experiment”? Public ownership and the narratives of post-war Britain’, Labour
History Review,  (), pp. –.
 On this, see Nuttall, Psychological socialism, pp. –.
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multi-sided view of the citizenry, part positive, part negative, about how far
they might aid or constrain the party’s objectives. This sense of the party’s view
of the populace as conﬂicted, plural, is under-represented in the now quite
voluminous and highly illuminating literature on the relationship between
Labour and the people. Much debate has centred on the extent of people’s
political radicalism in : research by Fielding central in positioning the
people’s role as a relatively apathetic, non-radical constraint upon Labour,
McKibbin, in contrast, recently reviving the view that ‘radicalization was
genuine’. If Labour ﬁgures’ own perceptions of the people are anything to
go by, both positions actually contain much truth. Labour’s enduring sense of
the people throughout the – period contained different layers: that they
were decent and kindly, capable of providing the impetus for major reform at
certain moments, most notably , yet also that this decency fell short of the
sustained reforming or egalitarian spirit the party most sought. Much focus
has been on Labour’s disappointment with the citizenry, Brooke charting the
‘often painful process’ since  of Labour discovering the public’s nature,
and Black observing how the party in the s seemed in opposition not just to
the government, but to society more generally. Both are correct. Yet, equally
signiﬁcant was the persistent determination of most leading Labour ﬁgures to
look more favourably upon the citizenry.
This article, thus, examines how Labour’s time-frames for social progress
were inﬂuenced by the party’s increasing consideration from the s of the
‘real world’ of what it felt people were actually like. In so doing, it seeks to point
to overlap in the concerns of historians of the party’s thought, and of its political
culture. The two have tended to proceed separately, with the former sometimes
little exploring how ideas were constrained by exposure to social realities, and
the latter little addressing the implications of their ﬁndings for understanding
Labour’s overall intellectual vision. This article is a history of Labour’s
political thought, but sharing the political cultural interest in perceptions of
‘the people’, and deﬁning thought inclusively, to incorporate the reﬂections
of leading intellectuals, but also key leadership, ‘labourist’ and trade union
 S. Fielding, P. Thompson and N. Tiratsoo, ‘England arise!’ The Labour party and popular
politics in s Britain (Manchester, ); S. Fielding, ‘What did “the people” want? The
meaning of the  general election’, Historical Journal,  (), pp. –; R. McKibbin,
Parties and people: England, – (Oxford, ), p. .
 S. Brooke, ‘Labour and the “nation” after ’, in J. Lawrence and M. Taylor, eds., Party,
state and society: electoral behaviour in Britain since  (Aldershot, ), p. ; Black, Political
culture, pp. , . See also S. Fielding, ‘To make men and women better than they are’:
Labour and the building of socialism’, in J. Fyrth, ed., Labour’s promised land? Culture and society
in Labour Britain, – (London, ), p. ; and S. Macintyre, ‘British Labour,
Marxism and working-class apathy in the nineteen twenties’, Historical Journal,  (),
pp. –, at p. .
 Note, for example, the relatively limited cross-over between two of the most notable
recent interventions in their respective spheres: Jackson, Equality, and Black, Redeﬁning.
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ﬁgures, whose analysis, if sometimes less systematic and more intuitive, could be
just as penetrating and revealing.
The Labour party provides a case-study in pluralism, people, and time that
also highlights the complexity and multi-dimensional nature of British political
history as a whole. One point of contrast with Labour’s chief political rival, the
Conservatives, also offers something to the extended debate concerning the
balance between success and disappointment in Labour’s historical record.
The brevity of Labour’s time in ofﬁce in the twentieth century has often been
contrasted with the Conservatives’, and indeed New Labour’s striking ability
to retain power. Yet, the different tempos, time-frames, and accompanying
expectations that the parties had, which partly explain these contrasts, have
been rarely noted. McKibbin has reﬂected on the very speed with which Labour
established much of the new post-war settlement in the later s. When in
government, by its very nature as a reformist party, Labour tended to act fast, to
be, as Black observes, ‘in a rush’. This has signiﬁcant implications. This very
reforming intensity, in a sense the very success of early implementation, often
left Labour more rapidly exhausted, politically, intellectually, even physically,
than the Conservatives –most notably by , and again by . Pre-
Labour governed brieﬂy, yet actively, often implementing large-scale structural
reforms, contrasting with the more elongated time-span, yet in some ways more
relaxed governing tempo, of New Labour and much Conservative time in ofﬁce.
Labour was perhaps, too, more engaged with its exemplary, educative role
than the latter two political forces were, seeking to reshape social values,
pursuing ethical change in a longer-term time-frame, even whilst in opposition.
Comparing the parties in simple terms of number of elections won rather
obscures these different tempos, time-frames, and methods of social inﬂuence.
Evaluating the historical success of different political parties at different
moments may, then, point to a need for a more complex plurality of different
measures of expectation, achievement, and disappointment. Certainly, Labour
marched to its own distinctive, multi-layered understanding of the British
people and time.
I I
Very different tempos simultaneously guided Labour’s history in the –
period, some fast and short term, others slower and longer term. This section
 Defending Labour’s performance, see, for instance, D. Tanner, P. Thane, and
N. Tiratsoo, ‘Introduction’, in D. Tanner, P. Thane and N. Tiratsoo, eds., Labour’s ﬁrst century
(Cambridge, ), pp. , –; N. Tiratsoo, ‘“You’ve never had it so bad”? Britain in the s’,
in N. Tiratsoo, ed., From Blitz to Blair: a new history of Britain since  (London, ), p. .
Pointing to the party’s limitations are D. Marquand, The progressive dilemma (nd edn, London,
); V. Bogdanor, ‘The crisis of old Labour’, in A. Seldon and K. Hickson, eds., New Labour,
old Labour: the Wilson and Callaghan governments, – (London, ).
 R. McKibbin, Classes and cultures: England, – (Oxford, ), p. .
 Black, Political culture, p. .
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focuses primarily on the factors shaping the faster tempos, the next section
on the slower, and how the party lived with the ambiguities of the co-existence
of the two. The heightened political intensity of the s in fact gave
added strength to both tempos, jolting Labour in two seemingly contrasting
ways: into both a new emphasis on patience, detailed practicality, and the
longer-term, and a new assertion of the party’s uncompromising idealism,
impatience with the existing society, and call for immediate, rapid results.
These diverse responses and tempos seemed both an apt reaction to the
problems of the depression, and reﬂected the party’s complicated conclusions
on MacDonaldism between  and : to seek to continue his
government-mindedness, yet also vigorously to assert its rejection of his
apparent embrace of establishment thinking.
An initial examination of two of the most representative party ﬁgures from
the s highlights immediately the different socialist tempos contained even
within the same Labour individual. One example is intellectual, R. H. Tawney,
who was respected broadly across Labour’s ideological spectrum. The other,
party leader from , Clement Attlee, was charged with politically uniting the
party in the context of both the acrimony after the  party split, and the
differences between a left, newly drawn to British adaptations of Marxism, and
emerging younger revisionists. Here, straightaway, one witnesses through these
central, and centrist (in Labour terms) ﬁgures, the mixed mind of Labour,
a mixture that was both political and psychological. There was an advocacy of
patience and impatience, restrained political sobriety and unyielding radical
urgency, focus on the immediate, yet an eye on holding back.
Rebuking the party for its argumentative factionalism in the early part of the
decade, Tawney, in his Equality () warned Labour that it must display
‘sense’ and ‘self-restraint’, not ‘hysterics’. Yet, just as important was exhibiting
‘extreme resolution’ in the implementation of a programme of common
ownership of industry, which was ‘radical’, and needed to be on a ‘substantial
scale’. Key social policy priorities, notably the abolition of fees in secondary
schools, were also ‘gross scandals’; the time-frame for dealing with them
was, thus, ‘immediately’. Attlee appeared to epitomize personally Labour’s
quest to appear dryly respectable, and emphasized in his The Labour party in
perspective () the need for the party to move from denunciations and
‘general principles’ to speciﬁc ‘steps’ and a focus on ‘power’. Yet, this was
accompanied by a bold assertion of socialism’s urgency, immediacy, and
qualitative difference from the existing society. The party’s role was not to
effect mere ‘alterations’, but to ‘replace’ an existing society that was ‘wrong’.
 R. H. Tawney, Equality (th edn, London, ), p. .
 Ibid., pp. , .  Ibid., p. .
 C. R. Attlee, The Labour party in perspective – and twelve years later (London, ), p. .
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Labour stood for ‘great changes’, and even its short programme would take the
country ‘a long way on the road’ to the desired endpoint.
The sense of urgency had a longer-term impetus, the feeling that the party, as
it moved into its fourth decade, could no longer plead relative youth in defence
of its as yet limited inﬂuence on British government. Consciously focusing, in
his book on socialism in The next ten years (), on the speciﬁc and immediate,
in both policy terms and time period, G. D .H. Cole reﬂected that whereas ‘pre-
war socialism could afford to seek after perfection, because it was not in a hurry
[my italics]: post-war socialism needs practical results’. Labour’s demon-
stration of its ability to tackle unemployment would have to be ‘speedy’, if it
wished to retain power, and this demonstration might have to come before the
longer-term aim of moving towards a socialist economy. Similarly, Tawney
insisted that the next Labour government should implement its programme
with ‘speed’.
There was also an underlying philosophical optimism which underpinned
the conﬁdence in a socialism rapid, immediate, and assured. For most leading
ﬁgures, the fairly linear, Victorian rationalist view of progress had been relatively
little undermined by the apparently complicating intellectual problems posed
by either the destruction of the First World War, or Freudian psychology’s
probing of the subconscious. Indeed, as Macintyre suggests, at this stage, the
war, in its apparent uprooting of the old world order, served to heighten more
than to dampen socialist optimism about the march of history in their favour.
This optimism was further boosted by the growing, if uneven, role of the state in
social and economic affairs over the ﬁrst three decades of the twentieth century.
Noting this thirty-year trend, Tawney asserted that the move towards uniﬁed
public direction and control of the major industries had ‘in large measure,
already been decided’. Such tendencies, Attlee suggested, were ‘impossible to
contend against’. Even one of Labour’s leading younger thinkers, Evan
Durbin, whose study of both zoology and psychology had qualiﬁed his optimistic
rationalism more than most, concluded, whilst musing over the future of the
Labour party in the autumn of , that ‘in British history – the left is always
victorious’. There was, still, a relatively uncomplicated sense of socialism as the
obvious prescription for social ills which, whilst severe, were ultimately a sort of
resolvable puzzle. Douglas Jay, writing in , offered socialism as a ‘cure’
 Ibid., pp. , , .
 G. D. H. Cole, The next ten years in British social and economic policy (London, ) (orig.
publ. ), pp. viii, .  Ibid., p. .
 Tawney, Equality, pp. , .
 Macintyre, ‘British Labour’, p. . See also J. Harris, ‘Labour’s political and social
thought’, in Tanner , Thane and Tiratsoo, eds., Labour’s ﬁrst, p. .
 Tawney, Equality, p. .  Attlee, Labour party, p. .
 E. Durbin’s notes on ‘[The] future of the English Labour party’, n.d., London, British
Library of Political and Economic Science (BLPES), Evan Durbin papers, /, fos. , .
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for poverty. The country’s problems were, Cole suggested, a ‘tangle’, which
needed ‘straightening out’. Early success with a number of key nationaliza-
tions, Tawney assured readers, would lead to the ‘mopping up’ of other
industries.
It would be wrong to suggest that Labour ﬁgures’ appraisals of the people in
this period was that they were a thrusting, mass, progressive force, further
strengthening the above grounds for optimism about rapid socialist advance.
But the citizenry was generally seen as progressive enough to be broadly, and
increasingly, an asset to Labour’s pursuit of change. This reasonable measure of
optimism about the people had three supporting pillars. The ﬁrst was not to
consider the matter too closely. The people were still something of a slightly
distant Other in Labour thinking and writing in the s, a phenomenon the
party was certainly beginning to think about, but did not yet seem crucial to an
agenda centred primarily around central government policy.
Secondly, the mass unemployment of the decade seemed such potentially
fertile terrain for the party to secure popular support that distinguishing what
might be deep-rooted socialist sentiment from what could be support more
conditional on the particular problems of the time seemed like nitpicking. On
the left, Harold Laski, whose blend of radical Marxism, ethical egalitarianism,
and liberal pluralism made him a notably multi-layered appraiser of the nature
of the people, was to develop some question marks about the citizenry as the
decade wore on, but, at this stage, in his The state in theory and practice ()
he was conﬁdent of their egalitarian instincts, ‘the constant drive of human
impulse towards the establishment of greater equality in society’. Here,
popular sentiments did matter, because of Laski’s call for the working class to
use their political and numerical strength to seize political power.
There seemed, thirdly, also to be some longer-term patterns afﬁrming the
people’s progressive potential. Attlee noted that the contemporary social
conscience was strong by historical standards. The philanthropic focus of earlier
generations had been replaced by a more fundamental willingness to examine
the whole system of social injustice; people sought to address causes now, not
just results. Workers were increasingly politically intelligent and conﬁdent, and
a cultural levelling between the classes meant the class divide was now primarily
an economic phenomenon. The ‘increasingly high standards of education of
the workers’, Attlee concluded, ‘are making the task of the socialist easier’.
The conﬁdence that socialism could be relatively rapidly and straight-
forwardly implemented was reinforced by a large measure of unity around a
speciﬁc and primarily economic policy agenda. Prioritization of the economic
could equally point to socialism being long term or short term. The complex
 D. Jay, The socialist case (London, ), p. ix.
 Cole, Ten years, p. .  Tawney, Equality, p. .
 H. J. Laski, The state in theory and practice (London, ), p. .
 Ibid., pp. –, .  Attlee, Labour party, pp. , , , .
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structural, and indeed motivational, changes that socialist proposals for
economic transformation often entailed could be suggestive of quite a long-
drawn-out time-scale. Equally, as in the s, an economic emphasis pointed
to problems that were urgent, speciﬁc, and tangible, and policies, most
notably nationalization and planning, that it appeared possible to implement
reasonably straightforwardly. Unemployment, then, argued Cole, was by far the
most ‘pressing’ contemporary problem. Even Evan Durbin, who, as we shall
see, emphasized strongly the pluralist, non-reductionist nature of his socialism,
nevertheless argued in his major work The politics of democratic socialism ()
that the priority must be placed on economic planning, and securing control
over the levers of economic power above merely ‘ameliorative measures’ of
social policy, because there would not be the resources for the latter until
achievements were completed in the sphere of the former. Jay stressed that a
focus on government economic policy was the best way to further broader
cultural or ethical objectives, as poverty was an over-riding bar to any real
broadening of the people’s horizons.
I I I
The high expectations of socialism discussed above, the sense of its large and
immediate possibilities, represented the foreground thinking of most leading
Labour thinkers in the s. But even at this early stage, there were co-existing,
complicating longer-term socialist time-scales, reﬂecting both an emerging
pluralism, and a growing sense of the people as potentially more problematic
for socialism than had been thought. If this period witnessed a late ﬂowering
Victorian rationalist optimism about progress, it also saw the construction of the
ﬁrst ﬁrm foundations of Labour doubts about it. The rise of Hitler and the mass
deprivation of the depression forced it to confront darker realities. For some,
the subject of appeasement crystallized these issues, Jay and Hugh Gaitskell, for
instance, opposing the Munich Agreement. Jay’s memoirs describe vividly
the personal signiﬁcance of his growing questioning of his prior assumption
that ‘monsters like Hitler could not exist in the real world’. Durbin’s
modiﬁcations of rationalist optimism were more extended, his exploration of
the non-rational psychological drives of the unconscious underpinning both his
strikingly early delineation of the horrors perpetrated in Germany and Russia
in the s, and his sense that educational expansion would not bring
the immediate or easy beneﬁts that some reformers hoped. Cole similarly
 Cole, Ten years, p. .
 E. F. M. Durbin, The politics of democratic socialism: an essay on social policy (London, ),
pp. , .  Jay, Socialist case, p. .
 Idem, Change and fortune: a political record (London, ), p. .
 Durbin’s notes on ‘Limits of intellectual education’, n.d., probably –, BLPES,
Durbin papers, /.
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concluded in a Fabian Tract in , in a very Fabian style, that ‘reasoning has,
and probably always will have, a limited appeal’.
These broader philosophical reﬂections were accompanied by more speciﬁc
observations of some of the perceived limitations of the British citizenry, or at
least the difﬁcult political challenges raised by them. On the whole, these were
not at this stage seen to have large problematic consequences for the overall
policy agenda of the party. But seeds were being ﬁrmly sown. The party crisis of
, and subsequent disastrous electoral showing, followed by its signiﬁcant
yet still partial recovery in , was beginning to bring home that many
formerly Liberal voters might be as likely to turn now to the Conservatives as to
Labour. Cities such as Birmingham and Liverpool consistently demonstrated
the strength of working-class support for Conservatism in the interwar years.
This began to result in some greater Labour probing of the nature of the
working class, and questioning of how automatically socialist or egalitarian it
might be. As it happened, this ﬁtted quite neatly with a steadily increasing
determination of the party in the s not to be seen as exclusively reliant on
an industrial manual working-class support base, but also to have at least some
hold on the votes of women, service workers, and agricultural labourers. This
reﬂected the electoral calculation of a need for broader support, but also a
heightening ideological preference for being an inclusive, national party.
Moreover, the more focused the party became on the details of policy and
aspirations to govern, the more closely it forced itself to inquire into aspects of
the people that might be discomforting. Some of this was quite low key, with the
motivations of the people regarded as a technical matter to be factored into the
ﬁne-tuning of economic policy. The writing of younger revisionist thinkers in
the s, such as Durbin and Jay, was partly designed to render questions
of the nature of the people less problematic by focusing on the high policy of
the state and its experts. Jay based his detailed economic prescriptions on
the assumption that people would behave as ‘normally self-seeking human
beings’. His well-known assertion in  about the gentleman in Whitehall
knowing best was complemented by his less-known subsequent interpretation of
the war effort as illustrating how much could be achieved politically when an
elite of the most talented combined their energies.
Other Labour assessments of the people were rather more dramatic, notably
that of the normally reserved Attlee, who, for a party leader, was strikingly
open about the electorate’s perceived failings. Under the pressure of material
deprivation, he lamented in , people’s horizons were ‘often deplorably
narrow’. Mirroring Durbin and Cole above, it was people’s intellect and
vision, less than their character, that most concerned Labour. The most
 G. D. H. Cole, The Fabian society: past and present, Fabian Tract,  (Nov. ), pp. –.
 On these latter points, see Beers, Your Britain, pp. –.
 Jay, Socialist case, p. .  Ibid., p. ; idem, Change, p. .
 Attlee, Labour party, pp. –, .
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powerful constraint on the party, Attlee warned, was ‘the lack of imagination
of the majority of people’. Contrasting somewhat with Laski’s view of the
egalitarian motives of the citizenry, Tawney’s experience alongside the working
class in the First World War led him to the view that they were no more imbued
by the egalitarian spirit than the other social classes. An indifference to
inequality was, he believed, a national characteristic, shared across class
boundaries, and even by some professed socialists.
There were also some intriguingly diverse layers in the left’s position on the
people as the decade developed. An enduring question for the Labour left, and
its historians, has been how far it has seen its radicalism as reﬂecting that of the
people, or as pursued determinedly despite considerable limits to the people’s
receptiveness. Some recent historiography, notably Thompson, has hinted at
the latter conclusion of a cruel choice between ‘electoral suicide or ideological
death’. Laski, by the time of his Parliamentary government in England (),
was reﬂecting that those Conservative and Liberal thinkers who feared the
potential brute force of working-class power could, in some respects at least, rest
more easily. He appears to have judged this both a positive and a negative.
Education had operated positively to dissuade people from hasty or ill-thought-
out political actions, and to broaden their time-frames; it had acted ‘to make
men take long views’. Yet, they, and he, had also underestimated a more
regrettable force, the continued hold on the people of ‘ancient routines of
thought’.
This had echoes, too, in an emerging pluralism on both the left and right of
the party in the s, which qualiﬁed, though it did not over-ride, the
prioritization of the economic. If the s was unsurprisingly a high point of
concentration on economic problems, social, cultural, and ethical dimensions
(and their relationship to the economic) were also increasingly asserting their
right to a hearing. Tawney, for instance, assessing the debate over whether
welfare policy should be considered secondary to economic policy, diverged
from Durbin’s over-riding prioritization of the latter, arguing that both should
be pursued simultaneously, and would mutually reinforce one another, a
point with which Attlee agreed. Jay forecast an increasing popular focus on
 Ibid., pp. –.
 R. Terrill, R. H. Tawney and his times: socialism as fellowship (London, ), p. ; Tawney,
Equality, p. .
 Though this was in speciﬁc reference to the last three decades of the twentieth century.
N. Thompson, ‘From The future of socialism () to a future without socialism? The crisis of
British social democratic political economy’, in J. Callaghan, N. Fishman, B. Jackson, and
M. McIvor, eds., In search of social democracy: responses to crisis and modernization (Manchester,
), p. . See also G. Foote, The Labour party’s political thought: a history (rd edn, London,
), p. , on Bevan’s ‘romantic view’ of the working class.
 H. J. Laski, Parliamentary government in England (London, ), p. .
 Ibid., pp. –.
 Tawney, Equality, p. ; Attlee, Labour party, pp. , .
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‘non-“material” things’ once material poverty had been addressed. Laski, by
, whilst still focused on the material roots of social problems, also
emphasized his openness to a multiplicity of causal factors: ‘the admission of
pluralism in historic causation is not the same thing as a denial of the primacy of
the economic factor’.
The increasing implication of this was that the socialist task was a
complicated, multi-layered, and demanding one, involving the raising of
people’s political consciousness. The growing pluralist highlighting of cultural,
educative, and ethical aims for the party to accompany its economic one could
point to slower, longer-term time-frames. If marked a pause for thought
within Labour, reﬂection on the preceding three decades sparked urgency that
time was running out to deliver, yet also the thought that perhaps three decades
was really not very long in the overall scheme of social change. Fabian, and
leading party expert on colonial affairs, Leonard Woolf, adopting a historical
approach to analysing the state of British democracy in his After the deluge
(), outlined the longest imaginable time-span for progress, the whole
history of humankind. Evolution, he noted, had brought people from their
animal state to a level of development that would seem impressive from that
original standpoint. But the long time it had taken to reach the current state of
civilization ought, he suggested, to caution both supporters and critics of the
newly emerging democratic culture and politics against expecting too much
from it too rapidly. The universal suffrage established in  was merely a
stage on the road to a real, deeper democracy, which depended on the
emergence of a genuine democratic conviction in the culture and mindsets of
ordinary voters. The rather apologetic disillusionment that this had not
happened yet which had already set in amongst some progressives just thirteen
years on, meant that they had not appreciated the long historical process at
work. The great distance people had already travelled suggested vast potential
for future change. It was perfectly possible for the average ‘man in the street to
become in a few hundred years as cultured and intelligent and politically
sagacious as any member of the present cabinet’.
Durbin’s charting in The politics of democratic socialism of the crucial
importance of psychology and emotional education to socialism, speciﬁcally
his sense that parenting, love, and a generally freer emotional outlook all had
major implications for the achievement of the more co-operative, gentler
approach upon which socialism depended, also had signiﬁcant implications for
his socialist time-frame. Changing politics by changing emotions ‘would take
decades’, he observed, and even that was assuming that there was the appetite
for this sort of enlightened approach, which, he made clear, there was not.
 Jay, Socialist case, p. .  Laski, State, p. .
 Ibid., p. .
 L. Woolf, After the deluge: a study in communal psychology (Harmondsworth, ); orig.
publ. ), pp. , –.  Ibid., p. .
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The process would have to occur ‘slowly’, and ‘from generation to
generation’. Given this time-span, one can understand Durbin’s reﬂection
in a speech in the summer of  that he was ‘often worried by excessive
enthusiasm about Socialism’, and how much it could achieve, a concern echoed
in Jay’s insistence that a socialist society ‘is not a Utopia’.
Attlee emphasized that Labour could not ultimately sidestep the issue of the
calibre of the people. Socialism was a more exacting creed than its competitors,
precisely because ultimately it both demanded and depended upon the
creation of the active, socially responsible citizen. So if Attlee’s main time-
frame was short, he also had a signiﬁcant eye on the long run. The necessary
eroding of the social snobbery and mean ideals which many people exhibited
would mean travelling down ‘a very long road’. The achievement of the
elusive and demanding egalitarian society Tawney envisaged would, he noted,
require a ‘prolonged’ effort of intelligence and resolution. There was also
some early evidence, two years before Labour took ofﬁce in , of an explicit
sense of the people as a brake upon change, Labour’s wartime deputy leader
Arthur Greenwood reﬂecting in a  radio interview that ‘a Party in
Government can only move as far, and as fast, as the majority of the nation are
prepared to go’. Even the radically idealist socialism of Richard Acland,
ﬁred by a strong Christian-based moralism, as well as a demand for extensive
common ownership, also found space for reﬂection on the longer time-scale
that such ethical transformation might necessitate. In his best-selling Unser
kampf (), written before he co-founded the Common Wealth party, and
seven years before becoming a Labour MP, he cautioned that whilst exceptional
individuals could develop altruistic qualities quite rapidly, ‘great masses of
people move much more slowly’.
The question remains of how Labour lived with, or reconciled, its diverse
views of people, progress, and time. There was a partial resolution of its
alternately supremely conﬁdent and deeply anxious view of the people, which
emphasized ‘middling’ virtues such as essential decency, common sense, and
quiet reformism. This was a perception of the British people that was located
between apathy and radicalism. It focused on the ordinary virtues of ordinary
people. The working-class trade unionist Ernest Bevin noted, in a 
broadcast, his admiration for the attitudes of working people, who possessed
levels of ‘understanding, ability and courage’ that would surprise some. Cole,
similarly, stressed that socialism would not require ‘superhuman intellectual
 Durbin, Politics, pp. –.
 Durbin’s ‘Open air’ campaign, summer , BLPES, Durbin papers, /; Jay, Socialist
case, p. .  Attlee, Labour party, pp. , .
 Tawney, Equality, p. .
 A. Greenwood, radio interview,  Jan. , Oxford, Bodleian Library (BLO), Arthur
Greenwood papers, MS , fo. .
 R. Acland, Unser kampf (Harmondsworth, ), p. vii.
 E. Bevin, broadcast,  Jan. , in E. Bevin, The job to be done (London, ), p. .
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capacity’. Greenwood called in late  for a socialism built on ‘conﬁdence
in one’s fellow men’.
If this reﬂected movement on one side, Labour feeling more warmth towards
the people, it also appears to have represented some movement by the people
in Labour’s direction. Mandler has identiﬁed changes in interwar conceptions
of the national character, in which the individualistic, adventurous, and slightly
aggressive John Bull was increasingly replaced by a gentler, domesticated, if
slightly bewildered archetype, partly encapsulated by the ‘Little Man’ of Sidney
Strube’s Daily Express cartoons. This character was certainly not a socialist, but
he was someone Labour could work with. One sees here, then, some increased
alignment between Labour and the people, reﬂecting democratic and patriotic
instincts in the party, as well as the fact that, as Beers has shown, they, and not
only the Conservatives, saw the interwar electoral necessity in appearing as a
party of the ‘national’ or ‘public’ interest. This reinforces, too, Lawrence’s
pinpointing of  as a surprisingly quiet election, symbolic of Labour’s wish
for the public to display its non-extraordinary or dramatic, but still politically
crucial virtues of quiet seriousness and reﬂection, in preparation for the
reforming task party and people would undertake together afterwards.
Equally, however, this did not mean Labour’s view of the people was now a
problem resolved. Its mixed perception of them remained, as it did of the
party’s view of time. It did not now seem either necessary or possible to resolve
whether socialism was the business of the tortoise or the hare, a patient dream
or a soon to be realized reality. Hence, the useful ambiguity in Cole’s assertion
that the change from capitalism to socialism would be ‘complete, though
gradual’, or Greenwood’s call for a socialism based on ‘sensible extremism’.
This complexity was summed up neatly in the party’s  general election
manifesto. The citizenry and prospective voters were congratulated: ‘this war
will have been won by its people’; yet also quite ﬁrmly scolded and warned about
having lacked the necessary interest in reform in : ‘the people lost that
peace’. Now, then, the people were on probation. Labour ultimately trusted
their ‘common sense’, but the election would ‘test’ this. There was a clear
sense of the radicalism of the party’s ‘ultimate purpose’, of the deep, ethical and
transformational character of the desired end, a Britain ‘free, . . . progressive,
public spirited’, and of Labour’s desire for change to be immediate and rapid,
its offer of ‘drastic policies’. Yet, equally evident was an incremental emphasis
 Cole, Ten years, p. .
 Greenwood speech, late , BLO, Greenwood papers, MS , fos. –.
 P. Mandler, The English national character: the history of an idea from Edmund Burke to Tony
Blair (London, ), pp. , –.  Beers, Your Britain, p. .
 J. Lawrence, ‘The transformation of British public politics after the First World War’,
Past and Present,  (), pp. –, at pp. –.
 Cole, Ten years, p. ; Greenwood speech, late , BLO, Greenwood papers, MS ,
fos. –.  Labour party general election manifesto, .
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on taking a ‘step forward’ and a ‘ﬁrst step’, the future would ‘not be easy’, there
would be no ‘baseless promises’, socialism ‘cannot come overnight’.
I V
Labour’s view of time, and of the British people, could never be quite the same
again after the achievements of its ﬁrst ever majority government between 
and . Before , socialism seemed primarily of the future, and Labour’s
view of the past was predominantly critical. By , Labour had now shaped
part of this past, and was thus, in some sense, complicit in the current state of
British society. Before, Labour had commented upon the people from a
distance. Now, it had joined with them, as they elected it by a landslide, to effect
a major programme of reform. This was, in a way, Labour’s end of youthful
innocence. It marked a signiﬁcant shift in the balance between its position as
critic of power and user of power. Moreover, it is striking how conﬁdently the
party now saw the thrust of contemporary socio-economic trends as being on its
side, and how far it reappraised more favourably not only the s, but British
history before it. Speaking to the TUC conference in , party chair Arthur
Greenwood reﬂected on how, during the past century and a half, Britain had
‘changed out of all recognition’. New party leader Hugh Gaitskell wrote
approvingly in  of ‘the abolition of extremes in both wealth and poverty’ in
the previous half-century.
Yet, whilst these were profound and in many ways lasting changes in the
party’s outlook, they sat alongside equally considerable continuity. The
essentially split-minded, multi-layered, mixture of optimism and realism about
the time-frames for social progress, and about the people, which characterized
Labour in , remained by , indeed by , and arguably well beyond.
In one sense, Attlee’s was, seemingly, the most simply, unambiguously, almost
mystically successful of Labour’s governments, to historians, ‘without doubt’ the
party’s most effective administration, its ‘ﬁnest hour’. But in other respects,
the developments of – complicated and confused for Labour as much
as they simpliﬁed; and its fundamentally split, multiple perceptions were
preserved.
The government’s very brevity created the ﬁrst complexity. That it was so
momentary in time, with much of the welfare state and nationalization
programme implemented in just three years, spoke simultaneously of the
magnitude and rapidity of its achievement, and yet also of how quickly the
people then voted it out of ofﬁce. The balance between constraint and
opportunity that had existed in  also pointed in different ways. The extent
 Ibid.
 Greenwood’s speech to TUC conference, , BLO, Greenwood papers, MS ,
fo. .
 H. Gaitskell, Recent developments in British socialist thinking (London, ), pp. –.
 Morgan, Labour, p. ; K. Jefferys, The Labour party since  (Basingstoke, ), p. .
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of what was achieved seemed all the greater because of the vast economic
constraint under which the government operated. Yet, focus on the substantial
political advantage of having had a clear, long-established, very pent-up policy
agenda and a relatively united party made some wonder if this had been a
moment of abnormal opportunity that had not been fully utilized. Highlighting
that this was a political moment in which it was especially difﬁcult to quantify
what might constitute reasonable expectations of achievement, Richard
Crossman simultaneously stressed his appreciation of the Attlee government’s
successes, and lamented ‘how great were its failures’. Perhaps most
fundamentally, the successful implementation of the welfare state and
nationalization appeared to be balanced, as revisionist historians have
emphasized, by the much more limited success in pursuing economic planning,
or achieving the maintenance of the ‘Blitz spirit’ as part of a fundamental
transformation of the ethics of civil society. More intensely so than for any
Labour government, then, there was a combined sense of heroic achievement
and ‘what might have been’. Summing up the paradox, Morrison concluded in
his  autobiography that it had been ‘the great Labour Government’, yet at
the same time one during which even Labour voters ‘had not really been
converted to socialism’.
Labour was conﬁrmed, then, in the ambiguities of its socialist time-frames.
The Attlee government’s achievements boosted conﬁdence in the rapid and
immediate, yet the heightened experience of the complexities and constraints
of government, and the increasingly pluralist nature of socialist thought in the
s drew fresh attention to slower, long-term pathways. This did seem like a
moment when greater precision about socialist endpoints might be possible,
and there was a rare willingness in some quarters to actually put a date on it. But
it tended to be a medium-term one, close enough to indicate a new conﬁdence,
far enough away to betray ongoing uncertainty. Laski’s view that the key change
had already taken place was relatively unusual. Reﬂecting shortly before the
war’s end, he adjudged the battle at Stalingrad as a symbolic turning point in
world history, marking the move from a capitalist and Christian era to one built
around socialism and science. More common was Michael Young’s forecast,
writing in , that ‘a socialist society may be attained by , not by ’.
At the same time, the young Crosland was musing in his notebook on the likely
state of socialist progress by , concluding that, with material redistribution
by then having gone as far as possible, the main focus would be on issues
relating to culture and quality of living, as ‘politics and economics fade away’.
 R. Crossman, New Statesman,  Nov. , privately held, John Strachey papers, contracts
box .
 See S. Fielding, ‘“The people”’; and Fielding, Thompson, and Tiratsoo, ‘England arise!’.
 H. Morrison, Herbert Morrison: an autobiography (London, ), pp. –, .
 H. Laski, Faith, reason and civilization (London, ).
 M. Young, Labour’s plan for plenty (London, ), pp. –.
 T. Crosland’s notes, n.d., c. –, BLPES, Tony Crosland papers, /, fo. .
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Furthering the sense of different time-frames, the inﬂuential revisionist
thinking of the period saw itself as both newly relaxing and newly intensifying the
socialist tempo. There was the cerebral revisionist emphasis on pausing carefully
to reﬂect on the best balance between socialism, freedom, and democracy,
evident in Gaitskell’s unusually explicit approval in  for a socialism that was
‘gradualist’, and the liberal-Whig tempo apparent in both the title of Roy
Jenkins’s Pursuit of progress (), and its assertion of policy being about the
quest for ‘a most delicate balance’. Yet, there was also the intensiﬁed focus on
the structures and ambience of social inequality which led Gaitskell impatiently
to warn that we were ‘still a long way’ even from a meritocratic equality of
opportunity, and the reforming zeal of Jenkins, who detected in his friend
Crosland a certain complacency, his otherwise positive review of The future of
socialism suggesting that it had exaggerated ‘both the inevitability and the
desirability of “quiet politics” in this country’. Revisionist perceptions of the
people furthered the double-sidedness, as they concluded that the opportunity
afforded for further change by the apparent shift leftwards in the people was
balanced by the sense that the very move to greater social justice had left
people more contented and conservative. Writing in Tribune in August ,
Tony Crosland suggested that in one respect the Attlee government had done
‘the easy things’; it had implemented the long-standing, the large scale, and,
in a way, the obvious: a welfare state and a nationalization programme, the
measures, as Crosland put it, ‘productive of quick reform and advance’, leaving
slower, longer-term tasks, such as educational reform, which ‘would give no
immediate or sensational results’. Developing this theme further in ,
Crosland pointed to a move towards further socialism that would ‘take time’, be
‘prolonged’, require a ‘difﬁcult effort of will’, yet he was equally emphatic about
an ongoing process of ‘further radical advance’.
The case of revisionism raises the important question of how far, by slowing
the pace of social change implicit in an ideology, socialism, it changed the
fundamental nature of that ideology. In other words, the issue arises of how far
Gaitskell’s belief in gradualism, or the revisionist–pragmatist Healey’s vision of a
socialism moving forward ‘by inches’, constituted acceptance of the slower time-
scales of Liberalism or Conservatism. Where Jackson has suggested that ‘at
least some of the revisionists were revising the ends as well as the means of
 Gaitskell, Recent developments, p. .
 R. Jenkins, Pursuit of progress: a critical analysis of the achievement and prospect of the Labour
party (London, ), p. .
 H. Gaitskell, Socialism and nationalization, Fabian Tract,  (July ), p. ; Roy Jenkins,
Forward,  Oct. .
 Crosland, ‘The way towards more socialist equality’, Tribune,  Aug. , BLPES,
Crosland papers, /, fo. .
 C. A. R. Crosland in R. H. S. Crossman, ed., New Fabian essays (London, ), p. .
 D. Healey, The time of my life (London, ), p. . A quotation by Healey of a Polish
acquaintance, Lesjek Kolakowski.
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socialism’, one might add that the time of arrival was also under revision.
There is little doubt that the pace of revisionism, with its emphasis on pause and
thought, chiming with the labourist, pragmatic Morrisonian emphasis on
consolidation of the existing nationalized industries without further large-scale
additions, did share similarities with the incremental progressivism of Liberals
and liberal Conservatives. Longer time-frames allowed a longer time for
different ideologies to intermingle and borrow from one another’s strengths, a
long-established historical process. Equally, the infusions of Liberalism and
even Conservatism that revisionism allowed did not prevent it from still seeing
socialism as a distinct and separate ideology, and revisionists’ demands for
change that was rapid were seen as part of that socialist distinctiveness, even as
they sat alongside a slower, and much more centrist, moderate tempo.
Aneurin Bevan’s thinking on time-frames illustrated a Labour left simul-
taneously pulled by a desire to seize the immediate, perhaps never to be
repeated, potential of the moment, and a wish to alert people to the relative
infancy of democracy and working-class empowerment, and its need to be given
proper time to ﬂower. He repeatedly placed the development of working-class
political attitudes in a longer-term context, warning against the danger of
expecting too much from them too soon. Writing in , he observed that
only ‘with the twentieth century [had] the ordinary man stepped into history’.
The granting of voting rights in  did not mean people had had sufﬁcient
time to develop the sort of outlook and democratic mentality that would enable
them to use their new voting power in a socially responsible way. In this sense,
Baldwin’s interwar electoral success was unsurprising, Conservative voting
reﬂecting the time the working class needed to mature politically. Musing
further in , Bevan insisted that socialism required ordinary people to reach
‘full stature’, which meant their accepting the responsibilities and sacriﬁces that
political choice brought, and not only the rewards. The people, he reminded
readers in , had ‘hardly started’ to use their power.
Yet, Bevan was equally drawn to the perceived urgency of the situation.
Growing working-class political consciousness was not an ever-upward linear
trend, it had to be nurtured by ‘continuing education’, consultation, and public
control. As early as , he was insisting that the moment for the working-
class voter’s decision was close at hand: ‘he either steps back to the shadows of
history once more or into the light of full social maturity’. These competing
time-frames partly reﬂected Bevan’s mixed feelings on the issue of working-class
agency, his focus on how power structures held them down matched by an
equally insistent belief that this was not an excuse, that ultimately they could,
 Jackson, Equality, p. .
 A. Bevan, Why not trust the tories? (London, ), p. .
 Ibid., pp. –.
 Idem, Democratic values, Fabian Tract,  (Jan. ), pp. –.
 Idem, In place of fear (London, ; orig. publ. ), p. .
 Idem, Democratic values, pp. –.  Idem, Tories, p. .
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should they choose, shape politics to their will. He oscillated between
optimism and pessimism in the s, his sense of the long game alternating
with anxiety that the people’s moment was slipping away. At one more
pessimistic point during the  election, shortly before his death the
following year, he lamented that the working class had had their opportunity,
and had been seduced by the gadgetry of afﬂuence: ‘now it is probably too
late’.
Perhaps the most illustrative framing of this mid-century point in Labour’s
history as both an unusually dynamic moment in itself, yet also part of a much
longer, almost glacial process of historical change, was the LSE sociologist, and
former Labour parliamentary candidate T. H. Marshall’s Citizenship and social
class (). Marshall observed a process of citizenship rights in Britain evolving
over two and a half centuries. Civil and political citizenship having been
achieved in the preceding two centuries, the twentieth century was witnessing
the development of social citizenship. In some respects, the long time-span
pointed to this, socialist-inﬂuenced, phase being an extended one. Marshall saw
it as being ‘of a different order’ from the ﬁrst two, because it encompassed ‘the
whole range’ from basic economic welfare to the necessary broader educational
and cultural fulﬁlment of the people. The recently passed  education act
was merely another, imperfect stage in this process, providing secondary
education for all, but in a meritocratic fashion which created winners and
losers, ‘a structure of unequal status’, in a way which was likely to lead for further
demands for change, as were some of the inequalities generated by the
continued existence of the competitive market. But if Marshall’s evolutionary
view of citizenship in ‘continuous progress’ pointed to the long term, he also
saw the current phase as ‘rapidly developing’. Indeed, the social rights already
gained had been ‘formidable’ to the extent that ‘our modern system is frankly a
socialist system’. As for the party as a whole, here, the socialist endpoint
seemed both clearly mapped out, yet persistently difﬁcult to pinpoint.
One crucial reason for this was that the people remained, in Labour eyes, a
mixed bag – but mixed, not unambiguously negative. What had changed since
the s was that the picture seemed a little clearer. The experience furnished
by both the ‘people’s war’ and the alliance between the people and Labour in
meant the sense of Otherness between people and party looked less, views
of the citizenry appeared less speculative, more furnished by evidence of the
people’s actual engagement on the political stage. Also changing was Labour’s
greater sense that they could not fully sidestep the issue of the people through
the technical excellence of state policy. Success in a democracy, Morrison
 Idem, Fear, pp. –.
 Cited in J. Campbell, Nye Bevan and the mirage of British socialism (London, ), p. .
 T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and social class (London, ), contained in T. H. Marshall and
T. Bottomore, Citizenship and social class (London, ), pp. –.
 Ibid., pp. , –.  Ibid., pp. , .
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concluded in , depended upon ‘the quality, the ability and the public
spirit’ of millions. Arthur Greenwood advised the  party conference that
‘progress is not accomplished merely by new laws and better administration.
It also depends on the interest and participation of the people as a whole.’
But what had not changed was the essential multi-sidedness of the party’s view
of the people. Labour felt it was now clearer, but clearer about both deﬁciencies
and virtues. The disappointment with the perceived limits to the survival of the
fraternal Blitz spirit in the s, and with the apparent seductions of afﬂuence
in the s, have been noted, and were considerable. But they co-existed with
a revived hopefulness, from both the retiring generation of Labour leaders,
and the emerging new one. The non-heroic, even humdrum, nature of the
depiction was even more marked than in the s, yet the conﬁdence in the
existence of this ordinary decency, and how it had elected and sustained a
reforming Labour government, was more secure in Labour ﬁgures’ minds also.
For Greenwood in , the desires of the people were ‘basically simple and
human’. Most people, most of the time, Attlee warmly reﬂected in , are
‘kindly’. ‘The British’, Morrison appraised in , ‘are a decent lot.’
Being in tune with the populace was now also praised as a virtue. In a broadcast
tribute to Bevin in , Attlee reﬂected that he ‘understood the people’.
At a dinner in  in honour of Attlee, Gaitskell discussed admiringly his
predecessor’s feel and sympathy for ordinary people, a feel that in fact made
him ‘most un-ordinary’. Overall, Labour’s unresolved mixed feelings about
the people remained: profound disappointment and deep reassurance.
Illustrating this mixed picture, Gaitskell conﬁded to his diary in August 
that voters were ‘utterly uninterested in nationalization of steel’, against
austerity, and tired of the government’s excuses, and yet ‘probably more
tolerant of the Government and appreciative of its difﬁculties than many
suppose’.
This mixed viewpoint was echoed in the perceptions of leading trade union
ﬁgures of the time, who were often concerned to highlight the essential decency
and common sense of ordinary people, especially in comparison to the
perceived abstractions of Labour intellectuals, yet were equally inclined to
showcase their realism about the limits to workers’ enthusiasm for participation
in industrial democracy, or collective solidarity. This was in the context of
 H. Morrison, Our parliament and how it works (London, ), p. , in Oxford, Nufﬁeld
College (NC), Herbert Morrison papers, box D.
 Greenwood’s speech to Labour party conference, , BLO, Greenwood papers, MS
, fo. .  Ibid., MS , fo. .
 C. R. Attlee, As it happened (London, ), p. .
 H. Morrison, News Chronicle,  Dec. , NC, Morrison papers, box B/, fo. .
 Attlee, Happened, p. .
 H. Gaitskell speaking at a dinner in honour of Earl and Countess Attlee,  Feb. ,
London, University College (UCL), Hugh Gaitskell papers, A.
 Gaitskell’s diary entry,  Aug. , in P. M. Williams, ed., The diary of Hugh Gaitskell,
– (London, ), p. .
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both the nationalization of key industries by the Attlee government (though,
signiﬁcantly, not the institution of industrial democracy) and a rise in trade
union membership between  and  from · to · million, neither of
which, however, appeared to alter the picture whereby a minority of union
members were highly active and participatory, but a majority much less inclined
to attend meetings or even vote in internal union elections.
Retiring after twenty years as TUC general secretary in , Walter Citrine
was praising of the fortitude of ordinary trade unionists in ﬁghting for
democracy against Hitler, yet also lamented that the improvements in their
material conditions had not been matched by moral growth: ‘it has scarcely
entered into the thinking of millions of workers that power brings responsi-
bilities’. Mineworkers’ union president Will Lawther, writing in ,
welcomed what he saw as an increasingly intelligent, educated, and demanding
workforce, but also pointed to the greater responsibilities workers must
undertake if industrial democracy were, as he wished, to be extended. Jack
Jones, midlands secretary of the TGWU in the s, and a ﬁrm advocate of
‘shop ﬂoor’ industrial activism since his organizing days in wartime Coventry,
emphasized the wisdom the manual working class brought to the Labour party
by virtue of their ﬁrst-hand experience of the ‘rough and tumble’ of real
industrial life; however, he also pointed to the average person’s inconsistency,
favouring trade union action when it beneﬁted themselves, but willing to
‘at the same time condemn as irresponsible a group of workers taking action
elsewhere’.
At its most fundamental, Labour’s still conﬂicted view of the people informed
and echoed uncertainty about its precise political purpose and underlying
attitude to power. The party remained much more ambiguous than the
Conservatives about how much it really wanted to be in government, to hold
power, to join with the people, to be part of the mainstream. The Conservatives,
though they, too, had objections to some of the drift of ‘modernity’ in the
s, were less qualiﬁed in their embrace of present-day society. As for
Labour, one is certainly struck, by , by how far it hadmoved towards seeing
itself as a mainstream people’s party. It was on the brink of holding ofﬁce for
eleven of the next ﬁfteen years, and was eventually able to at least momentarily
claim, as Wilson did in November , that it was now the natural party of
government. Yet, equally noteworthy was the resilience of its iconoclastic,
protesting, questioning attitude to and mixed feelings about power and
 Fielding, Thompson, and Tiratsoo, England arise!, p. .
 Lord Citrine, Two careers: volume two of the autobiography of Lord Citrine (London, ),
pp. , –.
 W. Lawther, Can industrial democracy survive? (London, ), pp. –.
 J. Jones, Union man: the autobiography of Jack Jones (London, ), pp. , , .
 On the complex layers within Conservative attitudes to social change and modernity see
M. Jarvis, Conservative governments, morality and social change in afﬂuent Britain, –
(Manchester, ), pp. –, .
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electoral success. Even Roy Jenkins, who was to occupy the highest ofﬁces more
than any of the other Gaitskellites (who were arguably the party’s strongest
advocates of pursuing electoral success), mused intriguingly in his memoirs
over ‘the question of how much I was truly at ease with power’. The
‘transition’ Gaitskell referred to in  in the party’s mentality ‘from the
pioneering stage to that of responsibility and power’ was thus ongoing,
qualiﬁed, and complex.
V
Was – a beginning or an ending? It is Labour’s, and its historians’,
ongoing uncertainty in answer to this question which makes it so difﬁcult to
periodize the party’s history. The very tangible and macro-level character of the
achievements of the Attlee government – the NHS, full employment,
nationalization –made it seem, both at the time, and often in later comparisons,
as a particular high point, from the perspective of which subsequent Labour
governments, with their more mundane concerns about precise levels of public
spending, or their micro-level education policy agendas, were almost bound to
appear less dramatically successful. Sociologically, too, – and its
immediate aftermath seemed to some like a not-to-be-repeated moment of
maximum potential, with its culture of mass party membership, and unionized
skilled working class from a still buoyant manufacturing sector.
Whilst in these senses, – was an apparent ending, in other respects,
it seemed like just the start. This was, after all, only Labour’s ﬁrst majority
government. Moreover, if it seemed like the beginning of the end for a political
agenda focused primarily on the alleviation of social negatives, those very
tangible material problems, more positive, participatory, and empowering
agendas in areas like education and industrial democracy, appeared very much
in their infancy. ‘The ﬁrst stage’ of socialism in , as Crossman saw it in
, had not, he contended, really involved the people, being administered
from above by the cabinet and civil service. The focus on people’s potential
and opportunity and associated educational expansion was more the zeitgeist of
the s than earlier, Wilson regarding his  government as engaging
in merely ‘the ﬁrst stages’ of ‘releasing the talents and energies of millions of
our people’. Really to address inequalities in educational opportunities,
 R. Jenkins, A life at the center (New York, NY, ), p. .
 Proof copy of Gaitskell’s foreword (Dec. ) for reprint of Evan Durbin’s The politics of
democratic socialism (London, ), p. , UCL, Gaitskell papers, A. See also Gaitskell, Recent,
p. .
 For a sense of decline from  to , see, for instance, Hennessy,Never again, p. ;
Foote, Labour, p. .
 Crossman, in Crossman, ed., Fabian essays, p. . See also Crossman’s introduction to
W. Bagehot, The English constitution (Glasgow, ), pp. –.
 H. Wilson, Purpose in power (London, ), p. xi.
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Crosland warned in , given the importance of parental inﬂuence, it would
be necessary ﬁrst properly to educate one generation, and then await their
chance to ‘stimulate the faculties of their children’. If education policy
seemed an area newly ripe for development towards the end of the period of
this article, interest in the broader rearing and nurturing of children, Durbin’s
distant dream, the implication of Edith Summerskill’s assertion in  that
‘the citizen of tomorrow is the product of all those inﬂuences brought to bear
upon him from birth’, appeared to be an intergenerational long-term challenge
that the party had only scratched the surface of by . From a range
of such perspectives, then, – is somewhat normalized, an important
foundation, but with much still to come. As Barbara Castle put it in ,
Labour was now about to embark on the ‘second stage of its historical task’.
Here, then, was a more pluralist periodization of different beginnings and
endings in different spheres of policy.
The question of whether afﬂuence was corrupting or liberating the citizenry
was at the forefront of Labour’s appraisals of the people by the end of the
period of this article. Black notes that socialists at this time were ‘disappointed’
by the people. This was certainly true, and yet that same co-existing optimism
about them and corresponding societal trends that has been identiﬁed since
 also held ﬁrm by . Moreover, the party’s previous defence of the
people’s character was now increasingly accompanied by a more positive view of
their intellectual and cultural standards. Jay pointed in  to rising book
sales, concert attendances, and visits to the Tate gallery as evidence of the
positive side of contemporary cultural trends, and identiﬁed a mixed picture of
‘corrupting forces’ and ‘civilizing forces’ in ‘battle’. Jenkins reﬂected in 
that ‘the satisfaction of wants is at least as likely to free people’s thoughts from
material things as to concentrate them there’. TUC assistant general
secretary Vic Feather wrote in  of the positive trends towards greater
equality and educational opportunity, which were also affecting the style of
trade unionism, with ‘less need for oratory and mass meetings’ and ‘more need
for books and periodicals’. Even an older generation of leaders was not
unreservedly critical of the modern. Reﬂecting on the inﬂuence of the radio
(though admittedly not television) in , Attlee concluded that it had
‘operated to make election audiences more thoughtful and more desirous of
listening to solid reasoning than in the old days’. In a BBC interview in ,
 C. A. R. Crosland, The conservative enemy (London, ), p. .
 E. Summerskill, ‘The citizen of tomorrow’, in H. Tracey, ed., The British Labour party:
its history, growth, policy and leaders (London, ), p. .
 B. Castle, New Statesman,  Sept. .
 Black, Political culture, p. .
 D. Jay, Socialism in the new society (London, ), pp. –.
 R. Jenkins, The Labour case (Harmondsworth, ), p. .
 V. Feather, The essence of trade unionism: a background book (London, ), p. .
 Attlee, Happened, p. .
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three years before he died, Morrison opined that over the preceding four
decades politics had become less dirty, and the electorate ‘more intelligent’.
The left, too, exhibited a mix of new hopes and new wariness about the
people. Crossman, anxious to empower them through a decentralization of
power, was simultaneously sceptical, remarking that the Christian doctrine of
original sin was a more accurate view of morality than Marx’s vision of the
classless society, and also warning Crosland in  not to deceive himself
that most people believed in equality. Castle, in contrast, saw herself
as ‘an optimist’, believing that the case for public ownership was being
strengthened, not weakened, by the afﬂuent society, and that people could be
educated into socialism, though she acknowledged that ‘it won’t be easy’.
Even by , which was beginning to witness a new phase of left-wing
grassroots activism, simultaneous optimism and uncertainty about the people
prevailed. Articulating this new phase was Tony Benn, who in his  Fabian
Tract, The new politics, pointed to people’s desire to ‘do more for themselves’,
yet also reported their ‘fears and doubts and lack of self-conﬁdence’. This
multi-sidedness echoes recent studies of post-war political or civic participation
which emphasize the complexity of people’s levels of engagement, Lawrence,
for instance, observing that people’s deliberative ‘“peaceable-ness” was not the
same as passivity’.
It is worth considering how Labour’s multiple tempos and time-frames ﬁtted
into the broader tempo of British politics by . It is probably fair to conclude
that there was, between  and , and intensifying thereafter, some
quickening in the tempo of politics; in the sense of governments being
expected to respond more rapidly to changing circumstances and ideas, the
media attention to politicians’ pronouncements and characters being greater,
and people’s expectations of government rising, all in a society where
convention was somewhat more open to challenge, and social class structures
were more ﬂuid. In these respects, the fast tempo side of Labour, its urgent
appetite for change, was in tune with the times. It was exempliﬁed by the
dynamism of Harold Wilson as leader from , his ability to communicate
effectively through the more immediate medium of television, and the
centrality of support for rising educational aspirations to the party’s programme
for the decade. Pimlott notes the initially ‘hectic pace’ of Wilson’s 
 H. Morrison, BBC Home Service interview, , NC, Morrison papers, D.
 Crossman, in Crossman, ed., Fabian essays, pp. –; Crossman to Crosland, Oct. ,
BLPES, Crosland papers, /, fo. .
 B. Castle, New Statesman,  Sept. .
 A. Benn, The new politics: a socialist reconnaissance, Fabian Tract,  (Sept. ), pp. ,
–, , .
 J. Lawrence, Electing our masters: the hustings in British politics from Hogarth to Blair (Oxford,
), p. ; idem, ‘Transformation’, pp. –, –, ; see also M. Hilton, ‘Politics is
ordinary: non-governmental organizations and political participation in contemporary Britain’,
Twentieth Century British History,  (), pp. –, at pp. , .
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government compared to the ‘relaxed atmosphere’ under Douglas-Home.
Yet, if the pace of politics was increasing, it was a steady, measured rise in the
walking pace, by no means a run, or even a march. Policy, for instance,
remained decidedly macro, with limited interest, for several more decades, in
the micro-policy of behaviour, standards, or outcomes. If Wilson performed well
on television, it was not with the intimacy or emotional connection of Tony
Blair; his best was still the more traditional, boisterous context of the large-scale
political meeting. If one of the least-noticed and most subtle of changes in
British politics over the course of the twentieth century was the way it became, as
Harrison has observed, ‘more complex’, this worked to quicken the political
tempo, yet also to slow it. The expansion of state welfare and the civil service, the
increase in social science and government research, and the increasingly
pluralist sense of the complexity and multi-layered nature of social problems
raised expectations, demands, and the sense of urgency about political action,
yet simultaneously heightened the need for reﬂection and consultation, and
the awareness of constraint.
Thus, the multiple tempos of Labour, and indeed its broader multiple
character found echoes in the wider British politics and society by . Labour
retained signiﬁcant reservations about the people, yet was also optimistic about
their ability to drive a new, more meritocratic and egalitarian age. Reﬂecting
this ambiguity and multi-layeredness, Wilson’s combination of reassuring
conventions and change seemed attractive to both country and party. He was
pipe-smoking, of plain tastes, and sceptical of revisionist critiques of Labour’s
traditions, yet young, iconoclastic, and presentationally adept, such that
Callaghan could reﬂect on Wilson’s offer of both ‘stability’ and ‘dynamic
action’. Given this, Labour’s unresolved balance of fast and slow tempos,
short and long time-frames seemed as apt for a country both eager for and
fearful of change in  as it had for the party itself since . Wilson
promised the white heat of a technological ‘revolution’ and a hundred-day plan,
yet also articulated this empirical pragmatist’s belief that ‘British socialism is
essentially . . . evolutionary’. The party’s  manifesto offered rapid and
dramatic change. Labour would ‘revitalize and modernize the whole economy’,
there would be ‘a revolution in training’, and ‘a revolution in our educational
system’. It would even ‘put an end to . . . personal selﬁshness’. Yet, equally
insistent was the reminder to the voters, whom the party saw as both a constraint
upon and essential contributor to their mission: there was ‘no easy solution’ to
 B. Pimlott, Harold Wilson (London, ), p. .
 Ibid., pp. –.
 B. Harrison, The transformation of British politics, – (Oxford, ), p. .
 Harold Wilson, News Chronicle, Oct. , BLO, Harold Wilson papers, MS ;
J. Callaghan, Time and chance (London, ), pp. , .
 H. Wilson, The relevance of British socialism (London, ), p. .
 Labour party manifesto, .
 J E R E M Y N U T TA L L
national problems; improvements in welfare services would ‘not be achieved all
at once’; addressing problems would take ‘time’.
V I
Perhaps beﬁtting its emphasis on the multi-sidedness of Labour, this article has
sought to display both the unresolved tensions at the heart of its thought, and
yet also how relatively effectively it managed to function despite them. There
was undoubtedly deep uncertainty in the way it looked to both long and short
time-frames, and gazed both positively and negatively upon the people.
Labour’s different time-frames were not always conﬂicting, and there was an
important element of consciously pursuing a twin-track approach of short-term
reforms allied to a longer-term educative agenda. But Labour also craved
clarity, precision, a uniﬁcation of their diverse timetables. That it did not
achieve this reﬂected ideological uncertainty over how far changing economic
structures would be sufﬁcient to change society’s underlying ethics, how far the
people were on the party’s side, and indeed how much this popular
participation mattered to achieving its desired social change.
Equally, though, the uncertain, multi-faceted outlook of Labour on people
and time was arguably an understandable and relatively sensible and
sophisticated response to issues which were indeed complex and many-sided.
If Labour in this period found the populace less radical than it hoped, it also
found it, at key electoral points, less conservative than it sometimes feared. If it
might have expected the country, from the standpoint of , to be further
along the road to socialism by  than it was, it had also, as it saw it, now
acquired much more concrete evidence than it had possessed before that it could
win, govern, and inﬂuence society. Above all, a Labour party that was itself
uncertain and conﬂicted about exactly what socialism or social progress meant
had managed to function, at least at certain crucial political moments, as an
important and creative force, despite the ambiguities with which it lived. If its
growing pluralist ability increasingly to accommodate and acknowledge political
complexity and multiplicity exposed it ever more fully as a broad church of, as
Harris puts it, ideological ‘haziness and eclecticism’, it was a haziness and multi-
dimensionality which was probably necessary for it to operate, and which also
enabled it to adapt to and remain relevant to what was an ever more complex
society.
Labour’s ambiguities and multi-sidedness on both time and the people
remain, in important respects, today. In some regards, – appears as a
distinctive, middle phase in Labour’s history to date, somewhere between the
idealism and pressure group role of the early century and the precision-
engineered election winning machine of more recent times, in which some of
the uncertainties discussed above were especially acute. But one is also struck by
 Ibid.  Harris, ‘Labour’s political and social thought’, p. .
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the continuity of these unresolved issues. Lawrence has written of the ﬁrst
decades of the twentieth century exhibiting Labour’s enduring dilemma of its
‘wish both to speak for the people, and to change them’. Whilst New Labour
has undoubtedly tilted the balance towards seeking to be ‘the people’s party’
more than the people’s critic, that same determination to educate the citizenry,
improve them, and hurry them along remains evident. In signiﬁcant
respects, the mix of immediacy and hurriedness with long-term patience that
characterized Labour between  and  also remains apparent, even if
the policies and, indeed, ultimate aims have changed. Certainly, the party is now
more world-weary, and places more overt emphasis on complexity and
constraint. Yet, if this points to a less apologetic focus on the long term,
contemporary Labour’s enduring enlightenment, educational optimism, its
sense of being in an epoch of especially rapid change, and its belief that it has
learned from past mistakes mean its hopes for what might be achieved quite
rapidly remain equally marked. Much has changed over the course of Labour’s
history, but its willingness to carry on going towards multiple and uncertain
endpoints has remained strikingly constant.
 J. Lawrence, Speaking for the people: party, language and popular politics in England,
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